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ABSTRACT
Public-health policy is inconsistent in its approach to the sexually transmitted disease human immu-
nodeficienc virus (HIV). Nearly every health agency has politicized the reporting, finding, and
contacting ofHIV cases. There is also no consistency among the various state health departments
and the various federal health agencies. Until we have a uniform health policy that treats HIV
infection as every other reportable sexually transmitted disease, we will make little progress toward
controlling its inevitable increase in both cases and costs. (C) 1994 Wiley-Liss, Inc.
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iublic policy, public-health policy, and govern-
ment policy all diverge when dealing with hu-
man immunodeficiency virus (HIV)-infected indi-
viduals and groups. This divergence itself is reason
enough for the lack of effective control of this
epidemic. This article examines why some of these
approaches are counterproductive and, in so doing,
makes a case for a return to accepted and demon-
strated public-health measures. Even within the
public policy-making bodies, there is divergence of
opinions and approaches to such important ques-
tions as: Should testing be generalized and not just
voluntary? Should partners be notified by public-
health authorities? Should infected incorrigibles be
isolated? Should government policy alter research
and funding plans to mount a "war on acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS)" as it did with
the "war on cancer"?
The public perception of AIDS is that it is a
major health problem worse than any other disease.
The National Leadership Coalition on AIDS found
that 50% of Americans list AIDS as their greatest
concern; only 7% are concerned about heart disease
and 32% are concerned about cancer. The reality
is that many more people will die of these 2 disease
groups than of AIDS. While AIDS is high on the
list of diseases measured in years of life forfeited, so
are automobile accidents and murder. Thirty-three
percent of Americans will die of heart disease; 24%
will die ofcancer; and only 1.5% will die ofAIDS.
For all the terrible perceptions about AIDS and the
extraordinary press coverage of this disease, AIDS
is only "a small blip" in America’s vital statistics.
2
Nonetheless, discussions about AIDS are given high
exposure in specific population segments including
health-care workers and certain highly skilled, ed-
ucated, and vocal groups, such as members of the
art and fashion industry. The netherworld of drugs
and those who live in poverty and within our inner
cities also have intelligent and vocal spokespersons.
Despite the very small percentage of people in
the general population who die of AIDS, it is now
in first place as a killer of American men aged
25-44 years and the fourth leading cause of death
among women of the same age.
3 In New York
City, AIDS is the leading cause of death among
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women between 20 and 39 years of age. Several
studies suggest that, by the year 2000, 50% of the
people in this country who are HIV positive will be
women.
4 It is well known that the situation world-
wide is worse than in the United States, particu-
larly with regard to heterosexual transmission, but
this article concentrates on the political responses to
this infection in the United States only.
These recent statistics about the rising HIV-
infection rate account for the advocates of special-
interest groups politicizing a viral disease out of
proportion to its place in the hierarchy of vital
statistics. Since the onset of the AIDS epidemic in
1981,204,000 Americans have died of AIDS and
its complications, with about 60,000 dying in the
current year. In this same year, approximately 1.5
million Americans will die of heart disease and
nearly million will die of cancer. Nixon’s attempt
to politicize cancer and end its devastation by throw-
ing money at the problem and placing the planning
and scientific supply-and-demand equation in the
hands of politicians failed. The same approaches
are taking place with regard to AIDS: the appoint-
ment of an AIDS "czar" and the creation of an
Office of AIDS Research (OAR) within the Na-
tional Institutes ofHealth (NIH) (discussed below)
are but 2 examples. These 2 examples are also
illustrative of the divergent approaches of govern-
ment. The "czar" is an administrative appointment;
the OAR is a legislative mandate. Who does what?
The divergence of funds from traditional research
mechanisms or the addition of funds outside the
usual scientific channels can only result in the same
failure.
Historically, the only political response to an
infectious disease was to ignore it or "stamp it out."
The best examples of the latter were a state’s re-
sponses to the plague and syphilis. Authorities quar-
antined and then burned whole communities har-
boring plague during the Middle Ages. The history
of the repression and ghettoization of prostitutes
speaks of political attempts to control syphilis. 5’6
The AIDS epidemic has generated an impressive
outpouring of state mandates and prohibitions be-
yond anything in the past. This has led to the diver-
gence from a public-health approach to finding and
controlling a disease to a political approach which is
based upon emotion and opinion, not upon scien-
tific and epidemiologic data. In fact, with the AIDS
epidemic, the politicians weighed in first by pro-
hibiting the collection of immunologic and sexual-
ity data that are essential to predict the patterns of
spread and enable effective control measures to be
instituted. These restrictions were followed by var-
ious and frequent conferences of public-health offi-
cials who established guidelines for collecting data
and protecting the individual’s health (as opposed
to the public’s health).
7 Only later did practicing
physicians express opinions promoting generalized
or involuntary testing and partner notification, 2
historic means of disease identification and control.
However, legislation and departments of health
mandates forbade these practices even in light of
the fact that polls have shown that 90% of non-
health-care workers believe that all patients admit-
ted to a hospital should be tested.
Lastly, the lawyers have expressed an opinion
about how this epidemic should be handled. The
New York Bar Association demanded sweeping leg-
islation giving HIV-infected people new protec-
tion, e.g., limiting the admissibility of HIV status
in divorce proceedings.
The usual truism is that, when a topic becomes
very controversial and the President wishes to avoid
making a decision, he appoints a presidential com-
mission. One could argue that the ultimate politici-
zation of a disease is to appoint a presidential com-
mission, which is as far removed from the scientific
method as one could wish. In the case ofAIDS, not
only was the commission a presidential one, but
Congress also wished to avoid any decision-mak-
ing. This led to the National Commission on AIDS
which was established by Congress in 1988 under
the Health Omnibus Program Extension (HOPE)
Act. Like most commissions, this group of 15 peo-
ple was to study the problem and make recommen-
dations to Congress. In addition, nearly every state
has created a gubernatorial commission to study
AIDS.
One of the first activities of the National Com-
mission was to travel worldwide to verify that AIDS
occurs elsewhere. They concluded that one cannot
understand AIDS outside the context of racism,
homophobia, poverty, and unemployment.
9 How-
ever, no one had wrapped gonorrhea, syphilis, han-
tavirus, or lyme disease with such baggage before
trying to identify cases and seeking some preven-
tion. These infections were dealt with by public-
health authorities and the scientific method, not by
presidential or congressional commissions.
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Goldman and Stryker
9 have asked if HIV is a
"special" infection for which informed consent for
testing and limitations on disclosure are required.
From a public-health point of view, the answer is
"no." The Commission believes that the answer is
"yes" because HIV-infected people are "shunned
and stigmatized." While this is true among large
groups within our population, the same could be
said about leprosy, which is no longer quarantined,
and for syphilis, which is more prevalent and grow-
ing faster than AIDS. While HIV infection may be
exceptional in morally relevant ways, it is not ex-
ceptional in any public-health way. Confidentiality
is the common denominator among these and other
diseases; stigmatization does not have to occur with
proper confidentiality and legislative protection
such as that guaranteed by the recently enacted
Americans With Disabilities Act. The Commis-
sion’s error is believing that HIV infection is qual-
itatively different from other infectious diseases. It
is not, and it should not be treated as such.
Cost is another argument presented by the Com-
mission against universal testing for HIV infec-
tion. They argue that mass screening programs are
prohibitively expensive. While this may be true
using current techniques and volumes of tests, the
cost/test would shrink with massive testing and sim-
pler tests. More importantly, no thoughts about
cost exist for syphilis screening, phenylketonuria
(PKU) screening for newborns, or for the antici-
pated high cost of mass screening for newly identi-
fied genetic diseases. If federal or state govern-
ments can negotiate for the price of certain vaccines,
they could negotiate for the price ofHIV screening
so that the cost-benefit analysis works.
An extension of the argument about generalized
testing is the question of what to do with the infor-
mation. Dr. Osborne, chairman of the AIDS Com-
mission, believes that an individual’s knowledge
about his/her HIV status will not change behavior;
the behavior must change first.
10 All logic refutes
such an argument. While 100% of any population
will not change behavior upon knowing if they are
HIV positive, certainly some percentage will. Even
if25% altered their behavior, both sexual and drug
related, a large fraction ofvirus would not be trans-
mitted and a large number of uninfected people
would be protected.
The most common method ofHIV transmission
in this country today is needle sharing by intrave-
nous (IV)-drug abusers. Once again, a political
response interferes with interrupting this means of
HIV transmission. Virtually every state has laws
that make it illegal to possess needles and syringes
without a prescription. The federal government’s
response to needle distribution is the usual reflex
from the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA): "No."
One of the best examples of the benefits from nee-
dle exchanges is the comparison of the HIV-infec-
tion rate among prostitutes in 2 cities of equal size
and equal economic situations. Newark, NJ (with-
out needle exchanges), has an HIV-infection rate
among prostitutes of nearly 50%; Liverpool, En-
gland, has a rate of only 1%, but they have an
active, mobile needle-exchange service.
11 In other
words, a scientific, epidemiologic approach is suc-
ceeding, while a political response has resulted in
failure.
Another example of a political response to the
AIDS epidemic was the passage of the Women’s
Health Equity Act by Congress in 1991.12 Some
women believed they were excluded systematically
from research funding and other health-care funds.
The political activism ofconcerned feminist groups
resulted in this act which prompted the Centers for
Disease Control (CDC) to add 2 criteria to the
definition of AIDS: cervical cancer and repeated
candida infections in HIV-infected women, caus-
ing the redistribution of some funds. This kind of
response has done nothing to control the spread of
this infection. Certainly, women are equal partners
in this disease, but a political responsea congres-
sional mandatedoes not accomplish what a scien-
tific approach toward studying female infections,
infected pregnant women, and perinatal transmis-
sion of the virus does for the long-term understand-
ing and control of this infection.
Politicization of AIDS has undermined the cus-
tomary scientifically accepted approaches to clinical
research. Vocal activists have short-circuited the
randomized, blinded, prospective studies tradition-
ally relied upon by the scientific community. The
consequence of this is that drugs are bypassing the
usual phases of clinical research. This behavior has
led to the mistaken impression that azidothymidine
(AZT) has prophylactic benefits, postponing the
development ofAIDS. Unfortunately, newer drugs
are also entering the same short-circuited pipeline,
diminishing the ability of scientists to determine
their worth. Less stringent criteria for research and
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subject selection may be politically correct, but they
are not scientifically correct.
The third arm of a traditional public-health ap-
proach to disease control (along with case finding
and partner notification) is education. The public
must be made aware of the organism, its mode of
transmission, and the current means of preventing
that transmission. Even this public-health practice
has been compromised by politicians. In 1986, the
CDC put restrictions on its grants to private com-
munity-based organizations so that they could use
money only for educational materials "unoffensive
to most educated adults.
’’13 The U.S. District Court
struck down this language as unconstitutionally
vague. This may be the ultimate political interven-
tion: a U.S. court countering a U.S. public-health
agency’s remarks in terms of the Constitution! As
one CDC official put it: "We’ve got to act now,
damn it. We have an epidemic that is killing more
people than have died in all American wars, includ-
ing the Civil War, and we’re still worried about
whether we can talk about condoms or not."13
The CDC proposed to educate teenagers and
prostitutes and sent their plans to the Department
of Education for review. They were rejected by the
Reagan Administration, which suggested that all
we needed to tell teenagers about AIDS was, "Don’t
have sex." The only thing needed for prostitute
education was to tell them, "Get another job.
’’14
Not only was a public-health educational plan com-
promised by politics, it was rendered totally inef-
fectual. Once again in the AIDS story, the public’s
health was undermined by politics, a particularly
bad brand of politics.
One of the most pernicious effects of the current
debate about AIDS is the political control of federal
research funds. An activist group, Treatment Ac-
tion Group (TAG), produced a 200-page critique
of AIDS research by NIH. This report received
serious attention in the Senate. Proposed legislation
would strengthen the OAR by giving it control
over NIH’s $1.3 billion AIDS budget after 5 years,
thereby adding another layer ofbureaucracy.
15 Fur-
thermore, it would allow the politicization ofAIDS
to intrude into basic research in addition to clinical
research. It is fair, I believe, to even question the
level of federal funding. The AIDS budget is ap-
proximately 10% of the entire NIH budget. On a
dollar-per-case basis, this figure is very much out
of line with where AIDS is in the hierarchy of our
national vital statistics.
Ignorance has fueled the promulgation of other
equally harmful political measures: legislation re-
quiring HIV-infected physicians to inform their
patients; a Florida bill requiring health depart-
ments to disclose to school boards the names of
children and employees with AIDS; expulsion of
HIV-positive students from school in at least 10
different countries; and the denial ofwork to HIV-
positive pilots by a Swedish airline. All of these
measures do nothing to prevent transmission of the
virus but result from the lack of needed education
and the politicization of a disease.
It is evident from the preceding discussion that
the public-health approach to AIDS has been over-
shadowed by a political approach affecting all phases
of the infection, from testing to education to re-
search protocols to funding. No other disease has
commanded so much political attention, much of it
to the detriment of those infected and to those at
risk. A misplaced compassion for privacy by a small
group of infected individuals and their advocates is
increasing the risks to a much larger population.
A return to standard epidemiologic and scien-
tific public-health practices--case finding, contact
tracing, and educationuoffers the best opportunity
to control the spread of HIV. As one informed
patient said to me recently, "I still don’t understand
why this is a political disease."
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